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1. INTRODUCTION
The traditional objectives of Britain’s energy policy have been that energy supplies
should be affordable and reliable. In the past couple of decades, an additional
requirement has been added: that energy production should not cause significant
environmental damage, in short, it should be sustainable or clean. Increasing concern
about the impact of fossil fuel (coal, oil and gas) use on the climate, on depletion of
fossil fuel reserves and on the political stability and hence reliability of the major fossil
fuel producers have meant these policy issues are more firmly in the public eye than
ever before.
In 1987, the Conservative party was returned to power in Britain on twin manifesto
promises to promote an expansion of nuclear power and to transform the electricity
industry from a nationalised monopoly to a privately own competitive market (often
termed liberalisation). All subsequent governments have, to a greater or lesser extent,
maintained these commitments as their major tools to achieve their energy policy
goals. More than two decades on from this promise, nuclear power has suffered
several reverses and its contribution to energy supplies is declining, and electricity
markets are far from the ideal of cut-throat competition that we were promised. Yet
these two policy measures remain at the head of the government’s agenda and the
commitment to expand nuclear is arguably stronger than at any time in the past 20
years.
In this paper, I will discuss why 20 years of effort to promote nuclear power and create
competitive energy markets has achieved so little and whether, in the coming decades,
they can be major contributors to meeting the policy goals of security, sustainability
and affordability. I will also examine how the prospects for building new nuclear power
stations are influenced by how competitive electricity markets are.
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1.1 Why do these policy measures still receive popular 
support?
At first glance, these policies, liberalisation and promoting nuclear power, might seem
entirely sensible. There is a common perception that public ownership generally results
in inefficiency and that competitive markets give consumers a better deal than a
monopoly. Under this logic, privatisation and creation of competition is sure to be
worthwhile.
The scale of fossil fuel use that has to be replaced to combat global warming and
reserves depletion is so large that only an apparently unlimited resource like nuclear
power can do the job. There are respectable arguments of principle that nuclear power
should not be pursued, for example on grounds of weapons proliferation, reactor
safety and waste disposal. For those that oppose nuclear power on any of these
grounds, whether nuclear power is economic and would be an effective way to counter
climate change is irrelevant. I make no judgement on these issues but they require
serious debate. My arguments centre on the economics of new nuclear power
stations. 
2. NUCLEAR POWER
2.1 British experience in the past 20 years
Few now believe nuclear will produce ‘power too cheap to meter’, but the perception
that nuclear power is a cheap energy source is still widely held despite all the damning
evidence that has emerged in the UK over the past 20 years. This includes:
• In 1989, in the failed attempt to privatise Britain’s nuclear power plants, it
emerged that the operating costs alone of Britain’s existing plants was double
the expected wholesale electricity price;
• In 1995, the Sizewell B nuclear power plant was completed at a cost to electricity
consumers of more than £3bn, yet a year later when the newer nuclear plants
were privatised as British Energy, it and seven other nuclear power plants of
about the same size were sold for only about half this cost;
• In 2002, despite acquiring these eight plants for a tiny fraction of their
construction cost, British Energy went bankrupt and was saved only by the
government committing £10bn of taxpayers’ money to it;
• In 2004, despite consumers being charged for 25 years by the companies to pay
for decommissioning the nuclear plants, it emerged that little of this money
remained. This has left future taxpayers with a bill for about £100bn to pay for
decommissioning the existing civil nuclear facilities from which they have derived
no benefit.
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2.2 Nuclear economics
To understand the economics of nuclear power, it is necessary to look at the relative
size of the components of the cost of a kilowatt hour (kWh). Areva NP, the French
vendor of nuclear power plants estimates1 that 70% of the cost of a kWh of nuclear
electricity is accounted for by the construction process, 20% by ‘fixed’ operating costs
and the other 10% by ‘variable’ operating costs. The construction cost part is
determined by three elements: the cost of building the plant; the cost of borrowing the
money to pay for the plant; and the reliability of the plant (the more output the plant
produces, the more thinly the finance costs can be spread). Most of the operating
costs are fixed because even when the plant is not producing power it has to be fully
staffed and regular maintenance will be required so little money is saved if the plant is
not operating. The decommissioning cost is included in this element and is highly
uncertain because there is minimal experience worldwide of decommissioning nuclear
power stations. It is likely to be of the same order as the construction cost, but the fact
that at the time the plant starts operating the expensive part of decommissioning is not
likely to be undertaken for 100 years means that a company deciding whether to build
a plant is not likely to worry much about the decommissioning cost. If we assume a
nuclear power plant would cost £1bn to build and £1bn to decommission, if the owner
invests only about £50m now and this earns a real annual interest rate of 3%, over 100
years that sum will have grown sufficiently to pay for decommissioning. Whether this
is a secure way to fund decommissioning is a complex issue I will not discuss here.
Of the variable operating cost, perhaps half is fuel and this includes the cost to mine
the uranium, ‘enrich’ it (increase the percentage of the useful uranium isotope),
fabricate it into fuel, store it after use and dispose of it in a safe repository where it
must remain isolated from the environment for several hundred thousand years. Fuel
raises a number of important issues, such as the adequacy of uranium reserves if a
large expansion of nuclear power is contemplated and whether it can be assumed
‘spent’ fuel can be isolated from the environment for this long. If the cost of uranium
ore were to rise sharply and remain high because of resource depletion, this would
raise serious environmental issues such as the increased impact of mining but from an
economic point of view, the cost of uranium ore could go up by a factor of, say, five,
and have little impact on the cost of nuclear electricity. The expected cost of spent fuel
disposal is high. Like decommissioning, there is little worthwhile experience on which
to base the cost estimates, but, like decommissioning, the costs arise too far in the
future to be of much concern to the companies that want to build a nuclear plant.
All of the cost components identified above deserve detailed analysis but in this paper,
I will focus on construction cost and cost of borrowing, the two elements that are most
controversial and which have the largest impact on the overall cost of nuclear
electricity.
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2 Department of Trade and Industry (2003) ‘Our energy future: creating a low carbon economy’ 
Cm 5761, TSO, London, p 12. http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file10719.pdf
2.3 New nuclear in Britain
While Britain’s experience with nuclear power has been poor up to now – there has
never been an ‘economic kWh of nuclear electricity in Britain - the past is past and if
there are compelling reasons to pursue nuclear power now, this poor experience
should not be a barrier. Britain’s proposed new nuclear power plants are based on a
new design generation of plants, which, it is claimed, will be cheaper, quicker and
easier to build, safer, will produce less waste and will be cheaper to decommission.
This is a remarkable list of advances especially given that, on paper, these new
designs do not appear so different to the previous generation of plants. These claims
have yet to be tested anywhere in the world as no plant of this new breed is actually
in operation yet and only a handful of plants are actually under construction, only two
of which started construction before the beginning of 2009.This is also far from the first
time that the nuclear industry has claimed that new designs will solve previous issues
and past mistakes will not be repeated because they have learnt from their errors.
Some evidence on whether these claims are justified is beginning to emerge on these
new designs, at least on construction cost and buildability. When the nuclear industry
began to promote these new designs a decade ago, it confidently predicted they could
be built for $1000 per kW of generating capacity. Typically, a nuclear plant of this new
design generation would have a capacity of 1.5 million kW or 1500 megawatts (MW)
and would therefore be expected to cost $1.5bn. Care must be taken in translating this
dollar cost into sterling as over the past decade the dollar-pound exchange rate has
fluctuated between £1=$1.4 to £1=$2. In October 2009, the exchange rate was about
1.6 and, a decade ago, the exchange rate was also about 1.6. So the forecast cost of
one of these new plants a decade ago would have been about £600/kW. The general
level of inflation over the decade has been about 30% so to bring that estimate up to
today’s money would increase it to about £800/kW.
When the UK government carried out a review of nuclear power economics in 2002, it
assumed a range of construction costs for new nuclear plants but did not specify its
central assumption. It claimed the information was commercially confidential, but the
assumption appeared to be around £840/kW, somewhat higher than what the nuclear
industry had been claiming would be the case. The government’s White Paper
concluded2: 
‘Its current economics make new nuclear build an unattractive option
and there are important issues of nuclear waste to be resolved.
Against this background, we conclude it is right to concentrate our
efforts on energy efficiency and renewables. We do not, therefore,
propose to support new nuclear build now. But we will keep the
option open.’
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4 A ‘carbon’ price of at least €36/t of CO2.
In 2008, when the government revisited nuclear economics, its assumed construction
cost was £1250/kW, representing a real increase in costs of about 20% over the 2002
figures3. Despite this increase in costs, the White Paper’s conclusions were very
different to those of a few years previously. The White Paper concluded:
‘Nuclear power is:
• Low-carbon – helping to minimise damaging climate change;
• Affordable – nuclear is currently one of the cheapest low-carbon
electricity generation technologies, so could help us deliver our goals
cost effectively;
• Dependable – a proven technology with modern reactors capable
of producing electricity reliably;
• Safe – backed up by a highly effective regulatory framework;
• Capable of increasing diversity and reducing our dependence on
any one technology or country for our energy or fuel supplies.’
The government claimed that nuclear power was the cheapest way to generate power
as long as the economic disincentives for using fossil fuels reached the level the
government expected4.  It predicted that, on this basis, power generation companies
would choose to build new nuclear plants in preference to other options provided the
government gave the necessary political leadership and streamlined licensing and
planning procedures. The government made a firm commitment that it would provide
no direct subsidies for new nuclear power plants and that the decision whether or not
to build nuclear power plants would be with the power companies. This promise of no
subsidies was a major factor in persuading some MPs, who were concerned about the
large amount of public money in the past that had gone into nuclear power for little
return, not to oppose the plan.
2.4 Experience outside UK
However, while the British government’s real construction cost estimate did increase
by about 20% between 2002 and 2008, in the rest of the world actual experience was
much worse. The first order for a new generation design, the EPR, came in 2003 for a
plant, Olkiluoto, in Finland of 1600MW for which the contract price was reported to be
€3bn or €1875/kW. At the exchange rates of the day (£1=€1.45), this was equivalent to
£1300/kW, significantly higher than the government’s assumption of only a year before
and higher even than its 2008 forecast. Construction started in August 2005 and from
the start, things went wrong and continue to go wrong. The scale of problems at the
site has become almost farcical. Olkiluoto was expected to take 4 years to build but
after 4 years of construction it was still about 4 years away from completion and the
expected cost had nearly doubled in Euro terms to about €3500/kW. At 2009
exchange rates (£1=€1.10) this is equivalent to £3200/kW, two and a half times the
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6 The Times ‘Reactors will cost twice estimate, says E.ON chief’, May 5, 2008, p 32.
7 S Thomas & D Hall (2009) ‘The financial crisis and nuclear power’ NPEC, Washington.
http://www.npec-web.org/Frameset.asp?PageType=Projects 
government’s 2008 assumption. The plant vendor, the French company Areva, which
is expected to supply plants of this design for the UK market, is suing the utility for
about €1bn for negligence and the utility is countersuing the utility for €2bn. The
Finnish safety regulator is threatening not to license the plant if design issues are not
resolved. The UK safety regulator has echoed these concerns. Resolving these issues
might delay build for any UK orders for this design and might increase costs.
The other new generation plant actually under construction (since December 2007), is
of the same design as the Finnish plant, and is in France at Flamanville. It is being built
by Electricité de France (EDF), the leading utility proposing to operate nuclear plants
in UK. After a year of construction, EDF acknowledged it was more than 20% over
budget at £2100/kW5. EDF has already built 58 nuclear reactors of modern design in
France, more than three times as many units as any other utility in the world and if any
company can build nuclear power plants efficiently, surely it is EDF. The problems at
Flamanville and Olkiluoto put the ‘buildability’ and the cost estimates for this design in
doubt. Experience at only two sites is too little from which to draw unequivocal
conclusions, but it is the only experience there is and it is uniformly bad, far worse than
even the most determined critics of nuclear power would have forecast.
Elsewhere, electric utilities in the West with plans for new nuclear power plants are at
the stage of talking to suppliers, identifying sites and estimating costs. In 2008, E.ON,
a company hoping to build new nuclear plants in the UK estimated that the cost of
building a plant in the UK would be 70% higher than the government was assuming6. 
In the USA, the US government is also trying to revive nuclear ordering, but in their
case by offering very large public subsidies for a few demonstration units. Estimates
are beginning to emerge from some of the utilities who plan to build plants there. The
utilities’ own cost estimates have increased markedly in the past 3-4 years and
seemed to clustering around the $5000/kW or about £3000/kW in 2009 with every
expectation that prices will increase further as the estimates are firmed up. A cost of
$5000/kW is more than three times the UK government’s estimate7. It should be
emphasised that these US figures are all pre-construction estimates. All experience
with nuclear power suggests that, as with Olkiluoto and Flamanville, pre-construction
cost estimates will be an under-estimate, often by a large margin, of actual costs.
At least two of the claims made for nuclear power by the British government, that it is
‘affordable’ and ‘dependable’, now therefore look dubious in the light of Finnish and
French experience and the latest cost estimates. 
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2.5 Cost of borrowing
In the past, financing the construction of new nuclear plants has never been a problem
because the electricity industry was a monopoly. If costs over-ran or the plant was not
reliable, the utility simply put electricity prices up to pay its additional costs. So, to a
banker lending money to a utility, a nuclear power plant was a low-risk loan and as a
result, the cost of borrowing was correspondingly low. This was a huge advantage for
a technology for which the costs are dominated by the cost of construction.
However, after the opening up of electricity to some form of competition, far from
perfect as we shall see below, the financial risk moves from the consumer to the utility.
In a market, if the cost of your product is too high, you go out of business if you cannot
improve your efficiency. This was clearly illustrated in 2002 in the UK when the nuclear
company, British Energy, went bankrupt because its operating costs were higher than
its income from electricity sales. British Energy could not unilaterally raise its prices to
cover its costs, it had to take what the market offered. Those that owned shares in
British Energy lost their money. Had the company been building a nuclear power plant,
the banks providing the loans would have also lost their money.
The banks that lent money to the Finnish utility building Olkiluoto will be biting their
nails to see if it can survive. If it does go under, and there is a serious risk now that it
will, the banks that lent to it could lose a significant part of their loans. Banks will
therefore now see nuclear investment as highly risky and the cost of borrowing will
reflect this. In its White Paper of 2008, the government assumed a range of costs of
capital of 7%, 10% and 12%. However, even the 12% rate, which produces an
uneconomically high cost of generation, appears far too low given the level of risk
building a nuclear power plant entails.
2.6 Can nuclear power significantly reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions?
If nuclear power really was an essential element to combating climate change then
there might be no alternative but to acknowledge that there are economic and other
problems and devise ways of reducing their impact. However, electricity accounts for
less than 20% of the energy we use and we currently get less than 20% of our
electricity from nuclear sources, so even if we replaced all the existing plants (which
would need about 6 new reactors) and built enough additional plants to bring the share
of nuclear electricity up to 60% (a total of 20 reactors), nuclear power would only be
providing about 10% of our energy needs. To make a real impact, electricity generated
using nuclear power would have to take over some of the markets currently supplied
by oil and gas, such as powering cars and providing space-heating and at the moment,
the economics of doing this look very poor. To get nuclear power’s share of energy
demand up to, say, 40%, would need about 80 new reactors and still the majority of
fossil fuel use would remain.
If we were to re-run the government’s estimated cost of nuclear power using
construction cost estimates more in line with recent estimates, say, £3000/kW and
using a real cost of borrowing of 15%, it is likely that we would get an overall price of
more than double even the highest estimates made by the government. At that price,
a lot of alternatives start to look very attractive. So it seems nuclear can only make a
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relatively small contribution to reducing greenhouse gases (for example, getting 10%
of our energy from nuclear) and at very high cost.
3. COMPETITIVE MARKETS AND PRIVATISATION
As with the cost of nuclear power, the public probably has a distorted view of how
successful the 1990 privatisation of the electricity industry has been. This is based on
the conventional wisdom that publicly owned monopolies are always a poor option.
This is reinforced by propaganda from the companies and, shamefully, from the
electricity regulatory authorities telling us how successful the reforms have been. Few
now remember that the electricity industry was not privatised because of any major
problems. The electricity industry gave good profits back to the Treasury, electricity
supplies were extremely reliable and prices were on a par with those of our main
European competitors. Aside from a limited reform in Chile in a very different context,
the model introduced in Britain was new and untested. So the reform was an act of
faith based on no hard evidence that privatisation and introduction of competition
would improve the service and with no particular problems it had to solve.
In principle, the model is very simple. The electricity industry can be divided, or
‘unbundled’, into four parts: generation of electricity (the power stations); retailing
(buying electricity from the wholesale market and selling to consumers including
reading meters and sending out bills); transmission (the high voltage cables that take
power from the power stations to the demand centres); and distribution (the low
voltage cables that deliver power to consumers). In terms of contribution to the overall
electricity bill, generation is usually more than half, distribution is perhaps a quarter
and transmission and retail both less than 10%.
Up to 1990, the industry was ‘integrated’ so that two sets of companies carried out
these four tasks. In England & Wales, all generation and transmission was carried out
by the Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB). All distribution and retail was
carried out by twelve Area Boards, such as the London Electricity Board. All thirteen
companies were owned by central government.
In the new model, the industry was unbundled into four separate sets of companies
corresponding to the four functions described above. Transmission and distribution
remained regulated monopolies: it would make no sense having two or more sets of
competing wires going into each house. Generation would be opened up to
competition so that companies generating electricity had to compete every half hour
of every day to sell their power. Only the lowest cost producers would survive. For
retail, consumers would be able to switch between suppliers so that any supplier that
did not match the lowest prices would soon lose all their customers. To ensure fair
competition, the tariff for use of the network would be the same for all users.
The CEGB was split into three competing generation companies, National Power,
Powergen and Nuclear Electric (which was still publicly owned) and a transmission
company, National Grid Company. The Area Boards still carried out distribution and
retail but had to make a strict separation between these two businesses so their
monopoly distribution business could not unfairly cross-subsidise their retail business.
The distribution businesses remained a monopoly within each Area Board’s existing
territory. However, the retail businesses of the Area Boards were able to expand
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outside their previous monopoly territories and were able to compete anywhere in
Britain. This was expected to mean that consumers would be able to choose for their
electricity supplies between at least twelve competing retail companies plus any new
companies, such as British Gas, that came into the market to sell electricity.
The elegance and the intuitive logic of this model made the attractions of the ‘British
Model’ compelling. Well before there was any evidence on how well the British reforms
had worked, the World Bank, the European Commission, numerous national
governments and the big management consultancy companies had been persuaded
to adopt the British Model as the policy that should be followed. The World Bank left
many developing countries with no choice by making their loans contingent on the
British Model being adopted. There is, therefore, a very strong vested interest for these
organisations, which had invested a large amount of their credibility in this model, not
to acknowledge any failings in the model.
3.1 Ownership
The idea that changing ownership from public to private would be sufficient to improve
performance can be easily dismissed. What little evidence there is on the relative
performance of privately-owned and publicly-owned utilities shows no evidence of any
superiority of private over public. Worldwide, the region where reforms are
acknowledged to have been most successful is the Nordic region (Norway, Sweden,
Finland and Denmark) which is operated as just one unified market covering all four
countries. This system is dominated by publicly owned companies, some nationally-
owned, some  locally-owned. The reality is that there are good and bad publicly owned
companies and good and bad privately owned companies. The logical answer for
dealing with the bad publicly-owned companies is to address the problems directly,
not simply change ownership in the hope this might, by chance, solve the problems.
3.2 Competition
So if the British Model is to represent a real improvement, it must be through the
introduction of competition not change of ownership and the evidence on competition
requires more careful consideration. To the consumer, the most obvious difference in
the new system is that consumers can now choose between competing energy
suppliers. But the real pay-off should have been in the wholesale market. In any
properly functioning market, the price should be essentially the same to all buyers so
if the wholesale electricity market is working well, the price that retail companies pay
for their wholesale supplies should be very similar. Retail costs should represent less
than 10% of the total energy bill, so even if one company was dramatically more
efficient than the rest, the savings it could offer consumers would be far too small to
make it worthwhile to switch. It was reductions in the price of generation resulting from
the introduction of competition that held out the promise of significant cost savings for
consumers.
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3.3 Wholesale markets
It is easy to make wholesale electricity markets seem immensely complex and
impossible for the lay person to understand and the British electricity companies and
the regulator have done little to de-mystify the market. However, the basic principles
are simple. National electricity demand varies constantly, electricity cannot be stored,
and supply and demand must match exactly at all times if the system is not to
collapse. This means that supply and demand have to be matched every half hour
(with some capacity on stand-by to cover the variability within that period) and
generators must specify every half hour the price they are prepared to accept to
generate power. An efficient market would choose generators in ascending order of
price bid until demand is just satisfied so that demand is just met by the cheapest set
of plants. When demand increases from one half-hour period to the next, the cheapest
generator not already being used should be used to meet the extra demand and when
it decreases the most expensive plant operating should be shut down.
This market would be the arena where power would be bought and sold and where the
market price would be set. This would make it easy for new generators and retailers to
enter the market to challenge the existing companies. If a new generator knew it could
beat the prices of its competitors, it could be sure it would be able to sell its power just
as any oil producer knows it can sell its oil at the world market price. A new retailer
would know it could buy power for no more than its competitors would have to pay,
so, if it could be more efficient than the existing companies, it would win customers by
offering cheaper prices.
The traditional function of system planning under which a central authority would
decide when new power station capacity was needed would no longer be required. If
the trend of wholesale prices was upwards reflecting a shortage in capacity,
companies would see the ‘price signals’ and would choose to build new power
stations to take advantage of the profits they could make from these high prices.
This form of competition sounds satisfyingly intense, but in practice, it is actually
probably too intense to be viable. The inevitable partner of competition is risk. A
company wanting to finance construction of a new power station costing perhaps
£1bn, would have to go to the banks to borrow the money. But they would not be able
to assure the banks how much power they would be successful in selling nor would
they know what price they would get when they were successful. In a genuinely
competitive market, success is not inevitable and prices are not predictable.
This leads to perhaps what is the greatest danger with electricity liberalisation. If there
are no safeguards against market failure, security of supply is in danger because there
will be no way to ensure there are sufficient power stations to meet demand. In a free
market, no company has (or can have) a duty to ensure security of supply. The
competitive model relies for security of supply on an assumption that just enough
power stations will be profitable to keep the lights on. Power stations that are not
profitable will be closed down. Their owners will not be able to justify to their
shareholders keeping a loss-making plant going just because its continued operation
is necessary to fully satisfy demand. When security of supply is at risk of being
compromised, market prices will go up sufficiently to trigger just enough investment to
fill any gap. Given that large power stations are likely to take a decade or more from
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start of planning to first generation of power, it is a heroic assumption to make that
price signals will be apparent a decade before a shortfall in capacity occurs. If there
are safeguards against market failure, the efficiency of the market is compromised.
The result of the risk the market imposes on generators is that they look for ways to
keep as much of their power out of the half-hourly wholesale market as possible to
make the risk of being a generator tolerable. They can do this by signing long-term
contracts at prices not related to the market price directly with the retail companies
that by-pass the market. Or, better still from their point of view, buy the retail
companies so that the power they generate is sold directly to their own consumers.
This is what has happened in the UK, with the 14 regional retail companies (twelve in
England and Wales and two in Scotland) all taken over by the five dominant generation
companies. The result is that trade in the visible market is negligible, representing 1-
2% of all power generated. With such a ‘thin’ market (the proportion of energy that
goes through the visible market) prices will inevitably be highly volatile and
unpredictable. Such a thin market will be far too unreliable for potential new generators
or new retailers to rely on selling into or buying from. Price signals are unlikely to be
dependable enough to base billion-pound investment decisions to build new power
plant on.
3.4 Retail markets
While generation is clearly no longer a monopoly, it is far from being the cut-throat
market we were promised. This means that if there is to be competition, the onus is on
consumers to force the companies to behave competitively by ruthlessly switching
supplier to the cheapest one on offer so that the companies know they have to match
the prices of the cheapest supplier if they are not to lose their consumers. Is this a
burden we should be placing on consumers?
For industrial consumers who have the resources and the negotiating power to
squeeze the best deal possible out of the electricity retailers, the answer may be yes
but for domestic consumers, the answer is no. This leads to the first major issue. In a
competitive market, the lowest prices go to those that can negotiate hardest. Making
the electricity market competitive effectively requires small consumers to be as tough
negotiators as an aluminium smelter or a chemicals factory. If they are not, the
companies will offer their best prices to large consumers and they will make their
profits from domestic consumers.
However, even within domestic consumers, the odds are stacked in favour of the
strong. Most of us are now accustomed to going to price comparison sites to check
the price of the insurance and financial services we use. To use these sites efficiently
to choose your energy supplier, it is necessary to know your energy consumption, not
such an easy thing to establish now meters are read so infrequently. The price
comparison site will identify the company that is charging the cheapest price today.
But of course you want to buy electricity in the future and there is no guarantee how
long the companies will retain their current prices. For example, in 2008, each of the
companies raised their prices four times.
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My most recent experience in July 2006 of switching energy supplier is instructive. I
established which company was probably the cheapest supplier (I had just moved
house so consumption could only be a guess) and began the process of transferring
to that company. Ten days later, this company put its prices up and was no longer the
cheapest. It took five months, and hours of my time on hold on the telephone trying to
sort out the details necessary to transfer to the new company. It was 18 months before
I was refunded the money owed me by the company I had transferred from which had
continued to supply me for those 5 months. It is clear that, despite my expertise in the
area and the vast amount of my time that was wasted, I saved little if any money from
this process. It is not an experience I am not keen to repeat, much less every time
prices change.
Even if the process of transferring was more efficient, it would be still be a heroic bet
on the consumer’s part that the company they transferred to would remain the
cheapest until they were prepared to switch again. More importantly, the process of
switching favours those who are computer literate, comfortable with figures and who
have a bank account that is stable enough to allow use of direct debits. The tariffs for
those that pay by pre-payment meter or who pay quarterly by cheque are on average
about 25% higher than for those who pay by direct debit and operate their account
online. There is not a shred of verifiable evidence that this price differential reflects real
additional costs on the companies – a crushing indictment of the negligence of the
regulator. Is it really a defensible policy for a service as vital as electricity (and gas) to
impose a system that leads to low income households paying such a heavy premium
to get the same service as richer, better educated consumers?
3.5 Industry structure
Having well-designed markets is of little use if the industry structure is not competitive.
If there are too few companies in the market there will be no reason for the companies
to compete hard. The initial UK electricity industry structure after privatisation had
faults, for example, there were only three competing generators. However, the
generation and retail sectors were kept separate. This should have forced the
generation companies to sell their power through the wholesale market making it
‘liquid’ enough to give reliable prices and a number of new generation companies were
entering the market. The twelve regional retail companies were privatised intact and
should have provided plenty of choice for consumers. However, for reasons the
government and the regulator never adequately explained, the logic of the reforms was
lost with the decision, seven years after privatisation, to allow the generation and retail
sectors to merge and to allow a massive wave of takeovers and mergers of generators
and retailers to take place. All the retail companies and almost all of the independent
generators were quickly swept up by six large companies. The result is that Britain is
now made up of six regional ‘duopolies’ in which 90% of the market is controlled by
the former regional monopoly company and British Gas, which has made significant
inroads into the electricity market selling electricity and gas as a package. Expecting
a market in which just two companies account for 90% of sales to be competitive is
not realistic.
Stephen Thomas17
There is also the issue of ownership. Four of the big six companies are owned by
European mainland companies, such as EDF. By comparison, the two remaining
British companies are small, have no worthwhile presence outside UK and it will be
surprising if these are not takeover targets for the four foreign owned companies or by
other European raiders. Whether it would matter that our energy companies were all
foreign-owned is debateable. No other European country has such a laissez faire
attitude to ownership. However, if the field of companies were to go down to four or
five, the suggestion that the energy market was competitive would be even harder to
argue.
3.6 Is competition a ‘free lunch’?
Most people assume, without thinking, that competition has no cost or negligible
costs, so that the benefits of companies being forced to continually reduce their costs
to remain competitive are the economists’ ‘free lunch’. But there are always costs of
competition. In many cases, the costs are relatively small compared to the potential
benefits and there is little doubt that the benefits exceed the costs of competition.
However, for a product as complex to deliver as electricity, the costs are significant
and diverse.
One very visible set of costs is for marketing. Competing companies do not win new
consumers without advertising and offering incentives, and these costs are inevitably
passed on to consumers.
A less visible set of costs is that of designing and operating the wholesale and retail
markets, which represented some of the most complex IT systems ever built. Each of
these cost in the order of about £1bn to design and operate for an initial period. Some
of this is building and operating computer software, but for the retail market there is
also the cost of the call centres to handle the requests to switch. The design constantly
has to be changed so this is not just one-off cost. Updating, maintaining and operating
these markets may still be costing consumers in the order of a hundred million pounds
per year, although the regulator has made no attempt to establish these costs.
A more difficult set of costs to evaluate is that of bearing the investment risk. Under
the old system, as argued above, risk lay wholly with the consumer. While it is galling
for consumers to have to pay for the companies’ errors, the reality is that risk exists
and, one way or another, bearing that risk has to be paid for by consumers. In the old
system, consumers paid directly through pass-through of any extra costs in the form
of higher prices. If the companies cannot pass on extra costs and their shareholders
have to pay for their errors through lower profits, this will be reflected in a higher cost
of borrowing because investment will be risky. This higher cost of borrowing will
inevitably be passed through to consumers and, because electricity industry costs are
so dominated by investment, this will have a significant impact on prices.
For consumers, it seems a ‘heads they win, tails we lose’ situation. Since consumers
will have to pay one way or the other, the issue is then which is the cheapest way to
deal with this risk. A well managed and regulated monopoly company with access to
low cost capital may well be the cheapest way to do this but nobody asked the
question as to whether it was.
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Finally, there is the issue of scale economies. For most industries, there would be a
common expectation that large companies, especially in technologically challenging
industries, would benefit from scale economies, which would allow them to buy
equipment efficiently, build and retain skills and develop new technologies. Ironically,
it is generally assumed that nuclear power can only be efficiently implemented with
large powerful companies. However, the logic of the new system is that there should
be large number of small companies competing with each other. In practice, the
government’s resolve to maintain a competitive field of companies was weak and, as
argued above, we now have too few companies to ensure real competition. However,
because it is nominally a free market, we cannot oblige the companies to carry out
training and R&D and the companies may well choose to generate higher profits than
to spend on things they ought to do but are not required to.
3.7 Does liberalisation make achievement of environmental 
goals easier?
There is a version of history emerging that when privatisation was planned, the priority
was improving the economic efficiency of the sector. The environmental objectives
that were prominent at that time, such as reducing acid rain, could just as easily be
imposed on a competitive industry as a monopoly industry. Under this version, climate
change and, to a lesser extent, fossil-fuel depletion and the resulting need to
dramatically reduce the use of fossil fuels in electricity generation came out of the blue,
well after the reforms were completed. As a result, there is a need to change the model
to meet these concerns, albeit still via the private sector and using so-called market
mechanisms. It is highly debateable whether these issues really were so unknown at
that time, but there should now be no doubt that they must be addressed.
The traditional approach to dealing with environmental issues was so-called
‘command and control’, under which, for example, government would set the
maximum level of emissions of pollutants allowed and plant owners had to meet those
targets. This approach was criticised as being inefficient and free market thinkers
advocated ‘market mechanisms’. Under this, a company would be required to reduce
their emissions to a given level via an ‘emission permit’ and they could do this in the
old way, for example, by installing abatement measures. However, if another company
that also emitted the same pollutants could reduce its emissions much more cheaply,
the first company could pay it to achieve the emissions reduction required of it by
‘trading’ permits.
Like the idea of competitive energy markets this has a superficial appeal but, like
competitive energy markets, the reality is that companies soon find strategies that
allow them to profit from these pseudo markets without necessarily meeting the
objectives of the markets. Under market mechanisms, using chicken dung from factory
farms or transporting palm oil from Indonesia to burn in power stations become ‘green’
measures. When these mechanisms become international in scope, the ethics of
market mechanisms become even more dubious. It is generally far cheaper to deal
with environmental issues in developing countries because labour is cheap and
environmental protection measures are less rigorously enforced, so market
mechanisms can lead to pollution being exported.
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There is strong evidence that a large range of energy efficiency measures are a more
cost-effective way to meet increased demand for energy services than building new
power stations even if there was not a priority on reducing fossil fuel use. However,
introducing competition to the energy business effectively closes off one of the
simplest ways of implementing energy efficiency measures. In the 1980s in the USA,
energy regulators recognised that nobody wants energy for its own sake; they want the
service it provides. Consumers therefore do not want the lowest possible kWh price,
they want the lowest bill. It may therefore make sense to pay a little more for each kWh
and use that extra cost to pay for energy efficiency measures that reduce the number
of kWh needed to deliver the required service. Under so-called ‘least cost planning’,
regulators designed tariffs so that a utility would make as much profit from installing
energy efficiency measures in its consumers’ premises, obviating the need for a new
power station, as it did from building the new power station. Consumers got lower
energy bills. Least-cost planning had begun to make a real impact on demand in some
progressive US states when liberalisation brought these programmes to a halt.
In an open market, no utility is going to spend money on improving its consumers’
energy efficiency if, a day after the improvements have been completed, the consumer
can switch to a different company leaving the company that did the improvements with
no way to recover its costs.
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4. ARE LIBERALISATION AND NUCLEAR POWER 
COMPATIBLE?
When the Conservative party made the twin pledges to introduce competition to the
electricity industry and promote nuclear power, there were serious doubts about the
compatibility of these two objectives. For example, in 1988, a Parliamentary Select
Committee wrote:8
‘The independent witnesses we examined were unanimous in their
view that [in a competitive electricity market] private companies
would be most unlikely to build new nuclear plants’
There were two interconnected issues. The introduction of competition to electricity
was bound to increase investment risk and the poor record, particularly in Britain, of
nuclear power plants being built to time and cost and operating reliably meant that
nuclear power would be a particularly risky investment. This meant that the cost of
capital would be way above the 5% real level that had applied up till then. For a
technology for which the overall cost was so dominated by construction cost, doubling
or even tripling the cost of capital seemed sure to destroy the economic case. The
energy markets created have turned out to be far from perfect and in some respects
that makes them even riskier because of their vulnerability to manipulation. There is
little experience worldwide in the past couple of decades to suggest that nuclear
power investment has become significantly less risky than it was in 1990.
Another issue is the size of company needed to build nuclear power plants.
Companies that build nuclear power plants need immense technical and financial
strength. This is hard to square with the need, if competition is to be effective, for there
to be large numbers of competing companies.
At first glance, the easiest way to stop new uneconomic nuclear plants being built
would be to make electricity markets as competitive as possible, while the easiest way
to stop the electricity industry being run on competitive principles would be to opt for
a large nuclear power programme, but these would be Faustian bargains. Nuclear
power should not now be pursued is because it is so expensive that it will tend to
impoverish future generations. The likelihood is that the latest British attempt to
revitalise the nuclear industry will be no more successful than numerous earlier
attempts. However, large amounts of money will be spent on the attempt and, more
importantly, alternative options for meeting the policy goals of making electricity
affordable, reliable and sustainable will not be vigorously pursued while the nuclear
option is pre-empting the available resources.
Competition in electricity markets should not be pursued because it too is
economically wasteful. It is also socially regressive, forcing disadvantaged consumers
to pay more for a vital product than richer consumers. It will also tend to compromise
security of supply and it will make the achievement of environmental goals more
difficult. The likelihood is that electricity markets will not become more efficient. Rather
they will be increasingly compromised as governments are forced to introduce
mechanisms to deal with the risk of market failures.
8 Select Committee on Energy (1988) ‘Third report, Session 1987-88, HC 307-1, HMSO, London
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4.1 SOLUTIONS
4.1.1 Nuclear power
Nuclear power has survived two decades of unrelieved bad news about its economics,
yet despite this, it has come back with stronger political backing than ever before. If
this battery of evidence is not sufficient to nail the myth that nuclear power is cheap
energy, it is hard to know what is needed. Another nuclear accident on the scale of
Chernobyl or even Three Mile Island might be sufficient to dampen the enthusiasm for
nuclear but this is not an option any sane person would wish for.
Nuclear power should be off the agenda for new power plants. The existing plants we
have will be in operation for many years and it will be more than a century before
decommissioning them is complete. So there will be a need for nuclear skills for
decades to come. The much greater risk is that we are not even training enough
nuclear technicians and scientists to look after the facilities we have let alone to build
a new generation of plants.
The lazy dismissals of energy efficiency as only having a marginal effect and of
renewables as only working when the wind blows need to be challenged. If nuclear is
off the agenda, the financial and political resources that it consumes so voraciously
can be diverted to the painstaking work that will be needed to ensure that the energy
efficiency of every dwelling in the UK is transformed, as can readily be technically
achieved. Resources will also be available to deal effectively with greenhouse gas
emissions and that means targeting all energy use, not just electricity consumption.
4.1.2 Liberalisation
The ‘credit crunch’ is probably near enough the financial equivalent of Chernobyl for
markets. But, like the conventional wisdom that nuclear power is cheap, the myth that
private markets are always the best answer is hard to nail. It is likely that in a very short
time, the rhetoric that markets and private companies are always efficient, and that
public ownership and universal service through a centralised provider is always
inefficient will be as unquestioningly accepted as ever.
As was clear with the traditional utilities’ pursuit of nuclear power, there was plenty
wrong with the old model even though in terms of reliability of supply, affordability and
equity, there was a lot that was good. What was needed was not to smash up this
proven system, but to build on its strengths and address the weaknesses. Whether
renationalisation of the companies is desirable is a moot point but it is politically and
financially infeasible unless, as was the case with the banks and the rail network, the
system fails so abjectly that there is no choice but to take the companies back into
public ownership. Like another Chernobyl, the failure of the electricity system is not an
event that should be wished for.
The first step would be to recreate national planning processes, not in the utilities but
in publicly accountable non-commercial bodies that have a responsibility to ensure
that reliable power is available at affordable prices. Brazil, a country that suffered
severe consequences from its attempt to implement electricity markets, has already
created such an institution with very positive early results. The fallacy that consumer
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choice is worthwhile also needs to be abandoned and replaced with properly regulated
prices that ensure that low-income consumers get a fair deal. Market forces can be
incorporated, for example, when a new power station is needed, the job can go to the
company that meets all the performance criteria at the lowest price, but the market
must be there to serve us, not vice versa.
4.1.3 What will happen?
While effective solutions are relatively easy to think of - replace nuclear power with
energy efficiency and renewable, and replace electricity markets with effective
planning – it is hard to imagine the circumstances that will see these solutions being
implemented other than catastrophic failures like a severe nuclear accident or a major
failure of the electricity system. Both major political parties have invested too much
political capital in pursuing these options for them to be able to contemplate reversing
their policies. The depressing prospect is that we will continue, as we have for the past
two decades, pouring money and effort into nuclear power and markets, with little
return for consumers, while ignoring better options.
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